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Summary
of Fires at Refueling Sites That Appear To Be Static Related
BACKGROUND/STATEMENT
OF THE PROBLEM:
Until September, 1999, the only motor vehicle refueling fires
that the Petroleum Equipment Institute (PEI) was aware of were
caused either by an open flame (smoking), lack of electrical continuity
between the nozzle and the gasoline dispenser, or a spark from
the engine compartment of a vehicle with its motor running. From
September 1999 through January 22, 2000, 36 ignitions of gasoline
vapors during the refueling process were verbally reported to
me at PEI. All occurred during dry weather. There were no open
flames and the engines were off. Continuity was verified between
the nozzle and dispenser. People that investigated the cause of
these accidents concluded that static electricity was the source
of ignition in all cases.
HOW PEI GOT
INVOLVED:
Although Americans pump gasoline into their cars between 16 and
18 billion times a year without incident, the fact that these
fires were occurring in the first place—and with what appeared
to be greater frequency—caused PEI to gather additional information
about the circumstances surrounding the fires. We carried an article
in the January 25, 2000, issue of PEI’s newsletter (TulsaLetter),
asking readers to report to us all refueling fires presumably
caused by static electricity. The same article and request appeared
on PEI’s Web site (www.pei.org)
on January 23, 2000. An online report form accompanied the newsletter
on the Web site.
WHAT PEI ASKED:
The newsletter asked readers to identify the make, model and year
of the vehicle, the type of fuel used, type of tires and driveway
finish, customer action while refueling, and any other information
they believed would be useful. We promised that no oil company
or PEI member names would be divulged. All responses were strictly
confidential. We offered to make the report available, upon request,
to TulsaLetter readers.
INFORMATION
PEI RECEIVED:
PEI received 47 first-hand reports of refueling fires attributed
to static electricity. We also obtained 34 Vehicle Owner’s
Questionnaires (VOQs) from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s (NHTSA) database which strongly suggested
that static electricity was the source of ignition. The reported
fires occurred between 1993 and April 1, 2000, with more than
half occurring from 1999 through April 1, 2000. Seventy-six percent
of the fires occurred during the five months from November through
March. The following information is contained in a
detailed report:
- Reports
by Year
- Reports
by Month
- Reports
by State
- Injuries
- Damage
to Vehicle
- Damage
to Station
Reports (first-hand
and NHTSA’s VOQs) were received from 26 states and Washington,
D.C. First-hand reports were received by PEI from 16 states. In
all the reports we were able to verify, no open flames, running
motors, or electrical continuity problems were involved. All but
one of the accidents occurred with conventional (not Stage II
vapor recovery) nozzles. Driveway surfaces included concrete,
asphalt, stone, crushed rock and dirt. Fires occurred with many
different types of nozzles, hoses, breakaways and dispensers.
No cell phones were involved. A wide variety of clothes were worn
by the refuelers. Rubber-soled shoes were worn by the refuelers
in 94% of the accidents where footwear was identified. A summary
of all the fire reports is also included in Document D.
WHY DOES THIS
HAPPEN?
The author of this report is not an expert on static electricity.
It does appear to many people in the industry, however, that electrostatic
charging was the probable cause of the fires. In many of the reports
we received, the refueler became charged prior to or during the
refueling process through friction between clothing and the car
seat to such an extent that electrostatic discharges to the vehicle
body, fuel cap or dispensing nozzle occurred. Twenty (20) reports
described fires before the refueling process began, when the fueler
touched the gas cap or the area close to it after leaving the
vehicle. Twenty-nine (29) fires occurred when the fueler returned
to the vehicle during the refueling process and then touched the
nozzle after leaving the vehicle. Fifteen (15) fires do not involve
either of these two fact situations. In all but one of these cases
the fueler was not the source of the electrical discharge and
the source of ignition cannot easily be determined. We received
insufficient information on seventeen (17) fires reported by NHTSA
to confidently categorize them.
PEI has recently
(in the last three months) received five excellent articles (Documents
E, 1-5) written over the last four years which attempt to explain
these types of fires. Most were written in response to similar
refueling fires in Germany, the United Kingdom and France from
1992 through 1997. Some offer very detailed explanations about
why these refueling fires occur.
INFORMATION
PEI DOESN’T HAVE:
Twenty (20) fires have been verbally communicated to us, but no
written reports have been submitted. As a consequence, these 20
fires were not included in our report. The American Petroleum
Institute (API) is in the process of conducting a survey similar
to this one. API has received "less than 15 reports of fires
due to static electricity." API’s information was also
not included in this report. We did confirm, however, that API’s
reports are from fires separate and distinct from those reported
here. API’s February 2, 2000, report form (Document C) and
its February 3, 2000, Consumer Advisory (Document F-5) are available
from PEI. The Consumer Advisory is available from the API Web
site: api.org.
RESPONSES:
Warnings have been issued by various companies and organizations
since November 1999 (Documents F, 1-6).
WHERE DO WE
GO FROM HERE?
PEI will continue to collect reports of fires, as well as theories
and studies about why these fires happen. To contact the author
of this report, refer to the numbers listed on the first page.
OTHER INFORMATION:
Information referenced throughout this summary is identified below.
It is not included with this report because of the number of pages
involved. We will mail a full set upon request. Contact PEI at
the numbers listed on the first page for a copy of the referenced
documents.
REFERENCED
DOCUMENTS
A. PEI
TulsaLetter – January 25, 2000
B. PEI Report
Form – January 23, 2000
C. API Report
Form – February 2, 2000
D. Summary
of Fire Reports
E. Articles
- German
DGMK Project 508 – February 1996
- Guidelines
for the Control of Hazards Arising from Static Electricity –
The Institute of Petroleum, London – March 1998
- Electrostatic
Ignitions of Fires and Explosions, Thomas H. Pratt, Burgoyne
Inc., Marietta, Georgia (1997)
- Report
on Refueling Ignitions on Petrol Filling Stations in Europe–
The Bulletin, Volume 35, August 1997
- The Role
of Static Electricity In Forecourt Fires In Europe – The
Bulletin, Volume 38, February 2000
E. Warnings
- Oil Company
Alert: Static Electricity Discharge Explosion Hazards –
November 24, 1999
- Motor Vehicle
Fueling Fires - Nebraska State Fire Marshal’s Office –
January 2000
- BP Amoco
Press Release – January 24, 2000
- Flash Fire
Alert – Alaska Army National Guard – February 2000
- Gasoline
Refueling Advisory and Safety Guidelines for Consumers –
API – February 3, 2000
- Three petroleum
marketer warnings issued January-March 2000
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